Aschenbrothers Blog

The following observations are related to the Foreign Affairs article by SecDef Robert Gates (link below).

http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20090101faessay88103/robert-m-gates/how-to-reprogram-the-pentagon.html

I was thinking of JM Coetzee's. "Waiting for the Barbarians" when "Barbarians at the Gates" came out.  But both books are apropos as one considers the dilemma facing the US military as described by Gates.  In the former, a governor of an imperial border town faces the growing realization that the strategic, operational and tactical decisions of the central government are doing more harm than good.  In the latter, the struggle between the good and greedy during a corporate take over of RJ Nabisco eventually demonstrate the power of money over the power of good sense.  Neither present an optimistic outcome for the US military as it struggles both with its external foes and its domestic allies. 

Frankly, I feel like Gates is pulling punches. He alludes to issues (the "deeply embedded" support for conventional modernization, a huge imbalance between DOD and DOS funding,  lack of internal support to change the DOD), but ends on a happy note, "United States' National Defense Strategy provides a balanced approach to meeting those responsibilities and preserving the United States' freedom, prosperity, and security in the years ahead." The problem is what he describes are not strategic problems, but institutional ones that a NDS doesn't address. 

If the SecDef wants change, he needs to pull the gloves off and bluntly state, "The military-industrial complex, Congress and our current promotion system are broken. Their respective focus on money, staying in power and the current definitions of what makes a successful leader are preventing the US military from becoming the flexible/adaptable learning organization it needs to be to face the challenges of the 21st century."

The reality is the SecDef has limited power to genuinely changed the behemoth that is the DOD.  But if this was meant to be a call to arms, it was more of a memo of hopeful future action.  Breaking tradition, aligning management and acquisition processes to current realities, seeing past what the DOD is comfortable with and promotes for, all these things require a definitive vision of where the DOD needs to get to and how it is going to do that.  The captains, majors and lieutenant colonels of today will quickly be made members invested in the status quo, to keep them engaged and focused on changing the DOD, they need a goal and path. 

As far as the need for change goes, the Army and Marines are currently soaked in the reality that has shaped Gates' vision of the current challenges. But the Navy and Air Force remain largely oblivious.  The exchange of ideas inside the DOD remains so slow and blocked by service tradition blinders that the simplest ideas can't even be extrapolated from one branch to the next.  

Tactically speaking a gentle remonstration with the hydra that is the DOD is probably best, but eventually someone in a genuine leadership position will have to put forward a vision and method to break the DOD out of its current stasis and turn it into a 21st century organization that is more partner in national security than a well meaning but often times bumbling giant.